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Article 2

STUDENT ARTICLES
Credit Scoring in the Insurance Industry:
Discrimination or Good Business?
J. Haakon Knutson*

I. Introduction
Insurance underwriting is based on gathering data about a risk
and using it to evaluate that risk.' Evaluating risk is how insurance
companies determine what price would adequately cover their
potential risk.2 Inherent in any evaluation scheme is risk
discrimination, which, if not deemed unfairly discriminatory, is an
accepted consequence of underwriting. 3 For example, when
evaluating an individual for life insurance, his or her age will
significantly affect the amount of their premium-the older the client,
the greater the risk.4 Similarly, when underwriting an auto insurance
policy, a significant risk factor is whether the client lives in an urban
area or a rural area-the more cars, the greater the risk of an
accident.5
Over time, insurers developed complex methods for
determining risk. In some instances, courts have found those methods
to be unfair and highly discriminatory. 6 Prior to the enactment of civil
J.D. candidate, May 2004, Loyola University Chicago School
of Law; B.A.,
English Writing, 1997, DePauw University.

1 Gary

Hernandez et al., Insurance Weblining and Unfair Discrimination in

Cyberspace, 54 SMU L. REV. 1953, 1953 (2001).
2

id.

3 See NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1992)

("Risk discrimination is not race discrimination.").
4

id.

5

id.

6

Id.
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rights laws such as the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 7 insurance
companies commonly drew red lines around poor or minority
neighborhoods; anyone living within these lines would not qualify for
various forms of personal insurance. 8 The practice, known as
"redlining," is prohibited by various state and federal laws. 9 Although
redlining has been condemned, many regulators and consumer
advocates believe the practice
still continues, disguised as elaborate
"risk evaluation formulas."' 0
Pressure from state regulators forced many insurance
providers to reexamine how they use an individual's credit history for
risk evaluation.' Numerous industry studies have searched for a
compromise. 12 Many states have enacted legislation regarding credit
scoring, either limiting the practice or prohibiting it altogether.' In
other states, however, insurers are allowed to use consumer credit
information without constraint. 14
Recently, there has been a surge in litigation regarding the use
of credit scoring to evaluate risk. Plaintiffs typically allege that credit
scoring is racially and economically discriminatory and therefore
violates federal anti-discrimination laws. These cases raise two
important questions: (1) whether plaintiffs can sue an insurance5
company in federal court in light of the McCarrin-Ferguson Act;'
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2002).
8 Brian Grow & Pallavi Gogoi, A New Way to Squeeze the Weak?, Bus. WK.,
Jan. 28, 2002, at 92, available at 2002 WL 935967 1.
7

9 Id.

1oId.
11 Id.
12

See, e.g.,

NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, CREDIT REPORTS AND INSURANCE

UNDERWRITING WHITE PAPER 1 (1996) (issuing recommendations regarding the
use of credit reports and other indicators as underwriting tools) (available for

purchase at http://www.naic.org/insprod/catalog-pub-whitepapers.htm)

(on file

with the Loyola Consumer Law Review).
13 See generally NAT'L ASS'N OF MUT. INS. COS., STATE
INSURANCE SCORING

LAWS-REGULATE, RESTRICT OR PROHIBIT (analyzing the laws of thirty-eight

states

that

either

regulate,

restrict,

or

prohibit

credit

scoring),

at

http://namic.org/state/credithistory.asp (last updated Apr. 9, 2003).
14 See id.
15 See

Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 306 (1999) (holding that, under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, an insurance claim brought under a general federal
statute must aid or enhance the state insurance regulation and not frustrate or
disturb any state policy).
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and (2) whether credit scoring discriminates against minorities.
This article explores the key issues surrounding the use of
consumer credit records for insurance underwriting purposes. Part II
outlines the practice of credit scoring and the reason some question it.
It also introduces the structure of state insurance regulatory
commissions and the application of the McCarrin-Ferguson Act. Part
III discusses a current class action in Texas, alleging that credit-based
risk analysis is a form of racial discrimination. Finally, Part IV of this
article addresses the pros and cons of credit scoring and suggests
possible solutions to ensure that consumers are not being penalized
based on their race or low-income status.

II. Background
A. Insurance and Credit Scoring
Insurance companies that use credit scoring rely on consumer
reports 16 to evaluate risk.17 The insurance industry has long
subscribed to the idea that there is a correlation not only between
18
financial stability and risk but also between credit history and risk.
In other words, people who have a favorable credit history are more
stable and are, therefore, better risks.' 9 Proponents of credit scoring
argue that a good credit history implies job stability and residential
stability. 20 The belief that there is a significant correlation between
credit history and risk has resulted in an increasing reliance on credit
reports by insurance providers. 21 In the automobile and homeowner
of insurers use
insurance industries, for example, an estimated 92%
22
premiums.
calculating
in
factor
credit reports as a
16 See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (2002) (defining
"consumer report" to include "any written, oral, or other communication of any
information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit
worthiness .. to be used in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor
in establishing the consumer's eligibility for credit or insurance to be used
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes .... ").

17 NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, supra note 12, at 2.
18 Id. at 4.
19 Id.
20

id.

21

id.

22

Grow & Gogoi, supra note 8, at 92.

318

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 15: 4

Companies use the reports in different ways. Some assign
significant weight
to a credit report, while others use it as only one of
23 many factors.
B. Credit Scoring and Discrimination
The growing trend of using credit reports to evaluate credit
worthiness has recently caused concern among insurance regulators
and consumer groups. They believe that credit scoring could be
used to discriminate against the poor, the elderly, and minorities.25
The mounting debate begins with the complex algorithms
insurance companies use to underwrite policies. 2 Opponents of
credit scoring are concerned because most insurers refuse to disclose
the mathematical formulas they use to evaluate a client's potential
risk.27 Opponents argue that it is impossible to determine whether
these complex formulas really provide a way for insurance
companies to determine the race of the insured.28
Although the industry's enigmatic formulas raise concerns
with critics, there are other discriminatory aspects of credit scoring.
For example, many non-white immigrants and other minorities face
discrimination due to their cultural biases against banks and other
forms of credit. 29 Their financial portfolios may have distinctive traits
that insurance companies use as a flag for denying them insurance or
charging them a higher rate.30
C. The McCarran-Ferguson Act
The insurance industry is regulated at the state level.3 Most

23

Grow & Gogoi, supra note 8, at 92.

24 id.
25 id.
26 MICHELLE MARTIN, INSWEB, YOUR CREDIT AFFECTS YOUR INSURANCE,

http://www.insweb.com/learningcenter/articles/auto-credit.htm
22, 2003).
27

at

(last visited May

Grow & Gogoi, supra note 8, at 92.

28 See Kenneth R. Harney, Is Computer

Underwriting Fair to Minority
Borrowers?,CHI. TRIB., Dec. 8, 2002, at CI, available at 2002 WL 104021245.
29

Id. at C2.

30

id.

31 MARTIN,

supra note 26.
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states regulate the use of credit reports in insurance underwriting in
some way, but the laws vary. 32 In Illinois, for example, although
insurers are allowed to consider a client's credit, they "may not refuse
to issue or renew a policy of insurance solely on the basis of a credit
report." 33 Even if a credit report is used "in conjunction with other
criteria," the report "may not include or be based upon the race,
income, ender, religion, or national origin of the applicant or
insured." In Maryland, on the other hand, an insurer cannot "refuse
to underwrite, cancel, or refuse to renew" a homeowner's insurance
policy or automobile insurance policy
based, "in whole or in part," on
35
insured.
the
of
history
credit
the
Prior to 1944, the United States Supreme Court consistently
held that the business of insurance was not commerce and therefore
was largely immune from federal regulation. 36 In 1944, however, the
Court held that an insurance company doing business across state
lines engages in interstate commerce, thus subjecting it to federal
regulation. 7 The Court also decided that the Sherman Act applied to
the business of insurance. 38 The ruling raised concerns that states
were losing their grip on the regulation of the insurance industry
and
39
that the federal government was undermining state authority.
In response, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act in
1945,40 which provided for state law primacy in the regulation of the
insurance industry. 4' It stated that, except for various antitrust laws,
32

See generally NAT'L ASS'N OF MUT. INS. Cos., supra note 13.

33 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/155.38(b) (2003).
34Id. at 5/155.38(c).
35MD. CODE ANN., INS.
36

§ 27-501(e-2) (2002).
Humana, 525 U.S. at 306.

37Id. at 306 (citing United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322

U.S. 533, 553 (1944)).
38

id.

39 Id.
40

McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 59 Stat. 33-34 (codified at 15 U.S.C.

§§ 1011-1015 (2002)).
41 The text of the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides the following:
(a) State regulation
The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or
taxation of such business.
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"[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance ... unless such Act specifically relates to
the business of insurance ....
,,42
D. The Supreme Court and Preemption
Federal action to prevent complained-of activities is
precluded by McCarran-Ferguson if (1) the action is taken pursuant
to a federal statute that does not specifically relate to the "business of
insurance," (2) the complained-of activities constitute the "business
of insurance," (3) the relevant state has enacted laws for the purpose
of regulating the complained-of activities, and (4) the application of
the federal statute would invalidate, impair, or supersede the state
laws.43
One year after Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
the Supreme Court noted in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin
that, "[o]bviously Congress' purpose was broadly to give support to
the existing and future state systems for regulating and taxing the
business of insurance.",44 The Court concluded that state regulation of
the insurance industry was in the best interest of the public and that
Congress intended to "throw the whole weight of its power behind
,45
the state systems ....
In 1999, the Supreme Court ruled in Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not preempt a plaintiff from
bringing a claim under the federal RICO statute because the statute
(b) Federal regulation
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890,
as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15,
1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September
26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended
[15 U.S.C.A. 41 et seq.], shall be applicable to the business of
insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.
15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2002).
42 id.
43

Wexco Inc. v. IMC, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 194, 195 (M.D. Pa. 1993).

44

Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946).

41

Id. at 430.
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complimented Nevada's insurance law. 46 The Court created a test for
determining whether a general federal statute impairs a state
insurance law, stating, "[w]hen federal law is applied in aid or
enhancement of state regulation, and does not frustrate any declared
state policy or disturb the State's administrative 4regime,
the
7
action.
federal
the
bar
not
does
Act
McCarran-Ferguson
The Court supported its ruling by defining "impair" as "[t]o
weaken, to make worse, to lessen power, diminish, or relax, or
otherwise affect in an injurious manner., 4 8 Applying this definition to
§ 1012(b), the Court concluded that McCarran-Ferguson does not
preempt a federal law that does not "directly conflict with state
regulation," or "frustrate any declared
state policy," or "interfere with
49
regime.
administrative
a State's
Both Humana and Prudential Insurance Co. provide a basic
foundation for courts to begin their interpretation and application of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Circuit courts have reached conflicting
conclusions, usually when they are faced with broad antidiscrimination statutes, such as the American with Disabilities Act of
1990 ("ADA"), the Civil Rights Act of 1968, or the Fair Housing Act
("FHA").5 ° These statutes often overlap with state insurance laws and
regulations prohibiting discriminatory practices, forcing courts to
determine whether the federal statutes are preempted.
This question surfaced recently when the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act preempted
claims against an insurer under the ADA. 5 The court held that state
46

Humana, 525 U.S. at 311-12.

Id. at 303.
Id. at 309-10 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 752 (6th ed. 1990))
(alteration in original).
47

48

49

Id. at 310.

See Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (2002) (prohibiting
racial discrimination in contractual relations and the maintenance of property); Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2002) (prohibiting discrimination in the provision
of services in connection with sale or purchase of a dwelling); Americans with
50

Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2002) (prohibiting disability

discrimination in employment for qualified disabled individuals).
51See Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 1999). The
plaintiffs in Doe sued their medical insurer for violations of the ADA and a state
law capping medical insurance policy benefits for medical care of Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") or AIDS-related conditions. See id. at
557. The Seventh Circuit held that the caps for care of AIDS or AIDS-related
conditions did not violate the ADA provision prohibiting discrimination in public
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insurance commissioners, and not the federal government, should be
responsible for determining whether health insurance providers
should 52
be able to set limits on the benefits provided to AIDS
victims.
Similarly, in Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals dismissed part of an ADA claim, holding that the
federal courts were "not equipped to become the watchdog of the
insurance business ...
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ciseros, held that
additional remedies provided by the FHA did not invalidate, impair,
or supersede Ohio 54insurance law and were not preempted by
McCarran-Ferguson.

III. Discussion
A. Current Class Action Suit in the Fifth Circuit
The McCarran-Ferguson Act is in a precarious position when
challenged under federal anti-discrimination statutes. The Act allows
states to regulate the insurance industry. 55 But, Congress also
intended for the Equal Protection Clause and other federal legislation
to prevent discriminatory practices in any business, even if regulated
by a state agency. 56 Although it is unlikely for an insurance company
to avoid federal anti-discrimination laws if its conduct is flagrantly
discriminatory, the question becomes more difficult when its conduct
is ambiguous, a situation that has surfaced in the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Texas.
Recently, in Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., a class of plaintiffs
from Texas and Florida sued Allstate Property and Casualty Insurers

accommodations. See id. at 561. Further, the court held that the interpretation of the
ADA to prohibit such caps was barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See id. at
564.
52

Doe, 179 F.3d at 564.

53 Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612 (3rd Cir. 1998). In
Ford,
the plaintiff sued her former employer and insurance company alleging that the
disparity between insurance disability benefits for mental and physical disabilities
violated ADA. d.at 603.
54 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1363 (6th Cir. 1995).

55 See quotation supra note 41.
56 NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 295 (7th Cir. 1992).
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in the District Court for the Western District of Texas. 57 They alleged
that Allstate uses credit scoring in a racially discriminatory manner
that results in charging non-Caucasians higher rates. 58 The plaintiffs
based their complaint on the theory that Allstate uses a secret creditbased formula to screen its applicants. 59 They contended that
Allstate's credit scoring system places non-Caucasian applicants in
higher rate policies and "target[s] non-Caucasians for the sale of
more expensive policies than the policies sold to similarly situated
Caucasians. ' 6° The complaint alleged 6 1 that Allstate discriminated
against non-Caucasians in violation of the right to be free of racial
discrimination in entering into contracts, 6263the right to be64 free of
racial discrimination in buying real property, and the FHA.
Allstate filed a motion to dismiss on three grounds: (1) that
the McCarran-Ferguson Act preempted the plaintiffs' cause of action;
(2) that the complaint was improper under the Buford abstention
doctrine; and (3) that the complaint failed to establish that Allstate
engaged in intentional discrimination.65 After dismissing the
defendant's second and third arguments, the district court confronted
Allstate's McCarran-Ferguson argument. 66
The court began its McCarran-Ferguson analysis with the
requirements outlined in Humana.67 Because the federal statutes
addressed were not specifically enacted for the purpose of regulating
insurance, the issue turned on "whether the application of these
federal anti-discrimination laws to plaintiffs' claims would
'invalidate, impair, or supersede' Texas and Florida state laws

Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., No. 02-50721, 2002 WL 1491650, at *1 (W.D.
Tex. Apr. 5, 2002).
57

58 Id.

Id. Allstate did not dispute that it refuses to disclose the credit algorithms it
uses to factor an applicant's risk. Id.
59

60 id.
61

Dehoyos, 2002 WL 11491650, at *1.

62

See 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

63

See id. § 1982.

64
65

See id. § 3604.
Dehoyos, 2002 WL 11491650, at *1.

66

id.

67

Id. at *2.
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68

Allstate argued that the plaintiffs' claims were preempted by
McCarran-Ferguson for the following reasons: "(1) both states have
comprehensive insurance regulatory schemes and laws prohibiting
discrimination in insurance; (2) state discrimination in insurance laws
provides no private right of action; (3) state choices about the proper
conduct of the business of insurance would be displaced; and (4)
Texas and Florida insurance departments are investigating the effect
of credit scoring on insurance." In addition, Allstate contended that
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha should be
the standard used to decide its motion to dismiss. In Doe, the issue
was whether the plaintiffs were protected under the ADA from the
defendant insurer's plan to impose lifetime benefit caps on health
insurance polices sold to individuals with AIDS. 71 The court ruled
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act preempted the plaintiffs claims
because, in general, federal courts have been reluctant to meddle with
insurance rates or any matter related to the content of an insurance
policy when state law clearly oversees that area of insurance
regulation. 72 The district court in Dehoyos disagreed with the
defendant's argument, distinguishing Doe because the issue before it
was not about the contents of the actual policy, but rather the access
to the insurance.73
B. Effect of Dehoyos
To date, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has not ruled on
the motion to dismiss Dehoyos. Whatever the outcome, the decision
will have a profound effect on the insurance industry and consumers.
Due to the significance of the case, several amicus curiae briefs have
been filed on behalf of both parties. Allstate's position is endorsed by
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and the plaintiffs
received support from the National Rainbow/PUSH Coalition and

68 Dehoyos, 2002 WL 11491650, at *2.
69

Id.

70

Id. at *4.See also Doe, 179 F.3d at 564, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1106 (2000)

(holding that an insurance policy with a cap on AIDS coverage did not violate Title
III, the public accommodations provision of the ADA).
7' Doe, 179 F.3d at 560.
72

Id. at 564.

73Dehoyos, 2002 WL 1491650, at *4.
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The League of United Latin American Citizens.74
1. Undermining State Legislation
In its amicus brief, the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States raises several concerns about the effect of a ruling against
Allstate. The Chamber argues that, if it allows the class action to
continue, the Fifth Circuit will be taking the teeth out of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. 75 If the plaintiffs are successful, the
Chamber of Commerce argues, the entire insurance industry will be
at the mercy of one lay jury's decision. 76 Since plaintiffs are a
nationwide class, all fifty states would be subjected to new
ratemaking requirements, including states that have already passed
legislation authorizing insurance companies to use credit scoring to
evaluate risk.77

The Chamber of Commerce also expresses its concern that
many states, like Texas and Florida, currently investigate credit
scoring and its potential dangers. 78 Since some of the states have not
reached a determination about the possible discriminatory
consequences of credit scoring, it would be improper for the court to
obviate their investigation. 79 In this instance, the Chamber of
Commerce argues, federal courts appear to be treading
near the
80
boundaries of state legislative and regulatory provinces.
Last, Allstate and the Chamber of Commerce argue that the
"procedural characteristics" of the Dehoyos complaint are
substantially different than the "procedural characteristics" available
in Texas and Florida. 81 For example, neither state's insurance statutes
permit a private right of action for policyholders to challenge unfair

74 See Brief of amicus curiae in support of Appellants by the
Chamber of
Commerce of the United States at 1, Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 2002 WL 1491650,
1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2002) (No. 02-50721) [hereinafter Chamber of Commerce
Brief].
75 Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 74, at 2-3.
76

Id. at 3.

77

Id.
78 Id. at 10-11.
79 Id.
80

Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 74, at 12.

81

Id. at 10-11.
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discrimination in pricing or other ratemaking issues. 82 Policyholders
who have complaints regarding pricing must go through public
administrative channels rather than pursue private judicial relief.83 If,
as the Chamber of Commerce argues, Dehoyos was about insurance
pricing, then Texas and Florida insurance regulations prohibit
the
84
decisions.
ratemaking
those
with
interfering
from
judiciary
2. Pricing or Policy Issue?
The PUSH Coalition and the League of United Latin
American Citizens agree with the plaintiffs that the real issue in
Dehoyos is not how to determine insurance rate structures, but how to
address race-based insurance policies and their seemingly inflated
premiums. 85 In its brief, the PUSH Coalition contends that credit
scoring is not simply a pricing tool used in the "business of
insurance," which would be protected under the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. 86 The PUSH Coalition argues that "Allstate is using credit
scoring as an insidious and systematic means of racial
discrimination,"87 and therefore, Allstate cannot avoid the plaintiffs'
federal claims.
In its brief, Allstate repeatedly argues that federal courts are
not equipped to handle the complex problem of insurance ratemaking. 88 The PUSH Coalition countered Allstate's conclusion,
arguing that this is not an issue that dealing with pricing or specific

82

Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 74, at 11.

83 Id.
84 Id. at 11; see also
CODE ANN. art. 21.21-6.
85

Fla. Stat. §§ 624.310, 626.9571 to 626.9581; TEX.

INS.

See Brief of amicus curiae in support of Appellees by National

Rainbow/Push Coalition and League of United Latin American Citizens at 2,
Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 2002 WL 1491650, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2002) (No.
02-50721).
86

Id. at *3.

87 id.
88

See Brief for the Appellant at 18, Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 2002 WL

1491650, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2002) (No. 02-50721) ("State legislatures have
expressly delegated the function of determining what is 'unfair' and policing
discriminatory rate making practices to expert insurance regulators." "Insurance
rates, and their regulation, are well known topics of extensive legal, social and

political debate, and require legislative or quasi-legislative judgments.").
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terms within an insurance policy. 89 Rather, the issue is
discrimination, and "federal 90
courts are well equipped to address racial
discrimination in any form."

IV. Analysis
Dehoyos is essentially a roadmap for the various issues raised
by the widespread use of credit scoring. The threshold issue is
whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act prohibits class action lawsuits
alleging federal discrimination violations. After the court rules on the
issue of forum, the focus shifts to the process of credit scoring and
whether it promotes racial or economic discrimination.
A. The Courts Are Likely to Allow Federal Civil Rights Claims
Allstate, like other major insurers, faces a difficult battle in its
attempt to invoke preemption protection in cases like Dehoyos.
Because of their blatantly racist practices in the past, the insurance
industry must overcome the public's distrust. 91 Arguments in favor of
preemption focus on protecting states' rights. But, in Dehoyos, that
argument weakens because the federal statutes appear to supplement
the state insurance statutes, rather than conflict with them. Also, the
states do not seem to mind. Although state officials in Texas and
Florida are investigating the practice of credit scoring, no state
official filed an amicus brief on behalf of92 Allstate to argue that
federal remedies would frustrate state policy.
Furthermore, the defendants in Dehoyos rely on the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Doe to support their request for preemption, but
Doe can be distinguished. In Doe, the court ruled that a cap on health
insurance benefits is a pricing issue, which should be determined by
the state insurance commission. 93 The court carefully distinguished
depriving individuals of insurance entirely and limiting the benefits
they receive. 4 In Dehoyos, the Fifth Circuit has been asked to decide
whether credit scoring is a pricing issue, which would be determined
89 id.

90

Id.

91Grow & Gogoi, supra note 8, at 92.
Dehoyos, 2002 WL 1491650, at *3 (noting that state officials did not appear
or submit arguments on behalf of the state or the defendants).
92

9'Doe, 179 F.3d 557, 560 (7th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1106 (2000).

94 Id.

328
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by the state, or a discrimination issue, which would be governed by
federal law. The plaintiffs' discrimination claims in Dehoyos "deal
with discriminatory conduct that affects access to insurance rather
than the content of the policies., 95 Unlike the claims in Doe, the
plaintiffs in Dehoyos do not challenge96 any specific benefits or
coverage of any Allstate insurance policy.
B. Effect on Consumers and the Insurance Industry
Credit scoring is being debated in various forums across the
country. Insurance supporters argue that they have proved that there
is a correlation between poor credit ratings and a higher percentage of
claims. Consumers argue that a credit blemish, like a late car
payment or bankruptcy, has no effect on their ability to safely operate
a car or increase the odds of their home being damaged. 97 The lack of
98
independent studies makes it difficult to confirm either position.
Further, the secrecy surrounding credit scoring makes an impartial
study difficult-if the factors determining the outcome of a study are
secret, then there can be little faith in the results.
The issue boils down to a balancing act-weighing antidiscrimination statutes against a potentially valuable underwriting
tool. Some major insurance companies claim to have reduced rates
for 63% of their policy holders by using credit information.99 They
argue that their credit rating systems reward financially responsible
people, regardless of their income level.100 Yet, what about the
individual who is undergoing a divorce-an individual whose
financials do not accurately reflect his situation? Is there any reason
to charge this person more for home insurance? Is their home more
likely to suffer storm damage or flooding due to a divorce?' 01
Questions like these will continue to arise until courts and state
legislatures find a balance between fairness and value.

Brief for Appellees at 21, Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 2002 WL 1491650
(W.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2002) (No. 02-50721).
95

96

Id.

97

Grow & Gogoi, supra note 8, at 92.
NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, supra note 12, at 12.

98

99 Grow & Gogoi, supra note 8, at 92 (citing Progressive Casualty Insurance
as the source of the 63% claim).
1ooId.
01 FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 626.9541(g)(2) (2003).
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V. Conclusion
Credit scoring continues to be a hot topic in all areas of
insurance. Consumers are pushing for information about how they are
evaluated by underwriters. With pressure being applied in federal
court and more litigation on the horizon, the insurance industry
cannot afford to ignore the issue of credit scoring. Unfortunately,
evaluating a potential customer is inherently discriminatory, to some
extent, due to the nature of underwriting. But the divide should not be
entrenched along racial or class lines. As more research is done and
more consumer pressure is applied, various state legislatures will be
called upon to address the issue to protect the interests of both
consumers and their insurers.

